Recall private signals are normalized to be equal to bids observed in data, i.e. 
The consistency of the estimator follows from a sequence of results, most of which were shown in Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2002) . First, I prove some smoothness properties of the bid distributions in equilibrium. Second, I show the kernel estimators^ l and^ converge in probability to l and uniformly overŜ B; . Then a version of the Basic Consistency Theorem in Newey and McFadden (1994) (which is generalized for extreme estimators with objective functions de…ned over random support) suggestsb k;r p ! b k;r for k = l; h and any r, where b k;r are equivalent to x k (r) under the normalization x = b 0 (x). Next, I show^ k;r (t;b k;r ) b 1 r (t;b k;r ) p ! b 1 r (t; b k;r ) k;r (t; b k;r ) for all t > r. Finally, I use the Glivenko-Cantelli uniform law of large numbers to show empirical distributions of B max l
B
(1:n) l evaluated at k;r (t;b k;r ) for k = l; h are consistent estimators for bounds on F R I (r) (t).
The lemma below extends the Basic Consistency Theorem of extreme estimators to those de…ned over random, compact sets (as opposed to …xed, compact sets). The proof is an adaptation from that of Theorem 4.1.1 in Amemiya (1985) and is included in Lemma A2 of Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2003) .
Lemma A1 Let Q(:) andQ N (:) be nonstochastic and stochastic real-valued functions de…ned respectively on compact intervals f (x; x; x 3 ; ::; x n )dx 3 :::dx n Under S1, the denominator is 0 if and only if x = x L . Since by S2, v h (x; x) has R + n 2 continuous, bounded derivatives on (x L ; x U ]. Furthermore, it can be shown that
also has R + n 2 continuous, bounded derivatives on any compact subsets of (x L ; x U ] 2 .
Therefore, b 0 (:) has R + n 1 continuous, bounded derivatives on any compact subsets of (x L ; x U ]. As for the boundary point x L , the proof proceeds by applying Taylor expansions of f around the zero vector in the de…nition of
, L(sjx) and v(x; x), and then showing b 0 admits up to R + 1 continuous, bounded derivatives at x = x L . It is a direct extension from proof of Lemma A2 in Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2002) and excluded here for brevity. That 
Consistency ofb k;r
The following lemma establishes the rate of uniform convergence of kernel estimatesĜ M;B andĝ M;B to G M;B and g M;B over S . It is a preliminary step for proving uniform convergence of^ l ,^ andb r (:;b l;r ),b r (:;b h;r ).
) follows from Lemma A5 in Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2002) . By triangular inequality, for all b 2
S B; with probability 1 and h G < h g for L large enough. Furthermore, note:
Since R > n, we can apply a Taylor expan-
). Since supb
The next lemma proves the uniform convergence of^ and^ l over the support S 2 B; .
).
. Note :
dt Below I show the two terms converge in probability to 0.
. With probability 1,
and
where
8 < :
! 0 by the uniform convergence of^ over
jGM;B(b;b)j
) with R > n 1 and supb
The boundedness of g M;B and implies
) which is the rate of convergence of sup b2S B; ^ . As a result,
) and converges to zero when R > 2n 3. Q.E.D.
The proposition below establishes the consistency ofb k;r using Lemma A1.
And
where both terms converge to 0 in probability since sup 
1.3 Consistency of^ k;r (t;b k;r ) for t > r
For the rest of the proof, I use^ k;r , k;r as shorthands forb r (:;b k;r ), b r (:; b k;r ) respectively, and^ k;r (t;b k;r ), k;r (t; b k;r ) to denote their inverses at t > r when there is no ambiguity. The purpose of this section is to show^ k;r (t;b k;r ) p ! k;r (t; b k;r ) for all t > r. To simplify the proof, let^ k;r (b) = r for b b k;r and k;r (b) = r for b b k;r . As is clear from below, this has no impact on the proof of consistency of^ k;r (t) as the inverses of^ k;r at t that is strictly greater than r.
. Under A1-3, S1-3 and if R > 2n 2,
Proof. The proof is similar to the last part of Lemma A3. On the support S 2 B; ,
jG M;B j < 1 and sup S 2 B; jg M;B j < 1 implies the supremum of the term in the bracket is
inf b2S B; jĜM;Bj inf b2S B; jGM;Bj where the two terms in the denominator are bounded below by h
) and h
) respectively by some constant and . It follows the denominator is bounded below by h
). Hence sup b2S B; jĝ
) and converges in
. Under A1-3, S1-3 and suppose R > 2n 2, then sup b2S B;
Proof. Consider the case where r is in the interior of S RP (or equivalently,
By de…nition,b k;r 2 S B; , and for sample sizes large enough and small enough, b 0 k;r is in the interior of S B; . By the triangular inequality,
:
It su¢ ces to show all four terms (denoted A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and A 4 respectively) converge in probability to 0 uniformly over b 2 S B; as sample size increases. For A 1 ,
L (tjb) L(tjb) p ! 0 using convergence results from previous lemmae.
2 Note for r in the interior of S RP ,
, and therefore
Also by the mean value theorem,
for someb k;r betweenb k;r and b k;r . The consistency ofb k;r for b k;r suggestsb k;r is bounded away from b 0 L as sample size increases. Thus both (b k;r ) and L(b k;r jb) converge in probability to some …nite constant since sup S B; jgj < 1 and inf S B; jg 0 j > c > 0 and hence
where the right hand side is o p (1) by the uniform convergence of^ ,^ , andL over S B; and S 2 B; under S1-3 and the boundedness of , and L on the closed interval [b k;r ; b
where the supremum of the …rst and last term over b k;r < b b 0 U are o p (1) by the same argument as above, and
By construction,b k;r 2 S B; . The uniform convergence ofL(tjb) for all t b on S Lemma A7 Let h G = c G (log L=L) 1=(2R+2n 3) and h g = c g (log L=L) 1=(2R+2n 2) . Under S1-3 and suppose R > 2n 2, for any r 2 S r ,^ k;r (t) 
Final step of the proof
is an i.i.d. sample from a population distributed as F Z . Then sup t2R jF n (t) F Z (t)j a:s ! 0. If F Z (t 0 ) is continuous at t 0 and a sequence of random variablet n p ! t 0 and t 0 is a continuity point of F , thenF n (t n ) 
for given r and t r. Q.E.D.
Part B: Monte Carlo Simulations
Bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual …rst-price and second-price auctions are e¢ cient in that they have exhausted all information that can be extracted from G B 0 under the assumptions speci…ed. Exactly how narrow these bounds can be is determined by the unidenti…ed underlying structure ; F X . In this section, I report analytical as well as Monte Carlo evidence on the performance of our bound estimators in …nite samples. The objective is to illustrate how the widths of estimated bounds vary with structural parameters such as the a¢ liation between private signals, the number of potential bidders n and the reserve price r.
Analytical impacts of signal a¢ liations
I start with an example where the impact of signal a¢ liations on how bounds on the all-screening probabilities (the probability that at no bidder bids above the reserve price in counterfactual formats) can be studied analytically. I use a parametric design where signal a¢ liations can be controlled. 
. In this design, v l (x; x) has a closed form, and the impacts of signal correlations on the widths of bounds on the all-screening probability can be studied analytically. The derivation of the closed form of v l (x; x; c) is included in the appendix. Figure B1 (b) plots the boundwidth x h (r; c) x l (r; c) as a function of reserve prices for each c. For any given reserve price, bounds on screening levels are narrower as c decreases and correlation increases. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that conditional on winning with a pivotal bid, the di¤erence between the winner's expected value and his expected payment in a SP auction decreases as the signals are increasingly positively correlated. When c = 0:1 and c = 0:2, the boundwidths are invariant for r high enough. For di¤erent signal correlations, Figure B1 (c) plots the size of bounds on all-screening probabilities in 1st-price auctions as functions of counterfactual reserve prices considered. That is, F X (1:2) (x h (r; c); c) F X (1:2) (x l (r; c); c), where X (1:2) is the higher of two private signals. As the reserve price increases, the size of the bounds are unambiguously smaller when signals have higher positive correlations. This is explained by the pattern in Figure B1 (b) and the distribution of X (1:2) as plotted in Figure B1 (e). Note the probability mass of X (1:2) is more skewed to the left when signals are less positively correlated. For a low reserve price r, both x l (r; c) and x h (r; c) are small and the bounds on the screening level under r are very close in size for all c. On the other hand, as Figure B1 (e) shows, X (1:2) has more probability mass close to 0 for higher positive signal correlations. Hence for r that are low enough, the size of bounds on the all-screening probabilities in 1st-price auctions is bigger for c = 0:1. For higher reserve prices r considered, the widths of bounds on the screening level is greater for higher c (and smaller positive correlations). Besides, the probability mass of X . In this case, the boundwidths associated with a smaller c is almost unambiguously smaller than those with higher c (and smaller correlations). Likewise, the pattern is explained by arguments as demonstrated in Figure B1 (b) and the distribution of X (2:2) plotted in Figure B1 (f). An obvious departure from the case of 1st-price auctions is that, for auctions with less correlated private signals, the widths of bounds on all-screening probabilities increase faster as r increases, reaches their peaks around r 2 [0:3; 0:4] and then decreases faster than in the case of 1st-price auctions. As Figure B1 (f) suggests, this is explained by the fact that when c is higher, there is more probability mass of X (2:2) around the center of the support, and the tail of the distribution diminishes faster. 2 ). The pure common value is V i = P n j=1 X j =n.
3
The two designs …t in the general framework of symmetric, interdependent value auctions, as independence is a special case of a¢ liation. Note the distribution of the average of signals depends on n, and therefore the number of bidders are not exogenous to bidders values. In both designs, the test distinguishing P V and CV auctions in Haile, Hong and Shum (2003) requires instruments as a source of exogenous variations in the number of potential bidders. Thus it is appealing to adopt our robust approach of partial identi…cation for these two designs, which does not require distinction between the two paradigms. I experiment with di¤erent numbers of potential bidders and reserve prices for Design 2. For each (n; r), I calculate the nonparametric estimates ofF k R I (r) from 1; 000 simulated samples, each containing equilibrium bids submitted in 500 …rst-price auctions. For Design 2,
and bids are simulated as random draws from a uniform distribution on [0;
)]. For Design 3, I vary distributional parameters and in addition to n and r. For each (n; r; ; ), I replicate the estimator for 1; 000 times, each based on a simulated sample of 500 auctions. For Design 3,
. Equilibrium bids are simulated by …rst drawing 500 n signals x il randomly from the truncated distribution, and calculating b 0;n (x il ) through numerical integrations. I use the classical approach of midpoint approximations for numerical integrations for the rest of the article. For both designs and each r, the true counterfactual revenue distribution F R I (r) can be recovered by inverting b r (:), which can be calculated with knowledge of their closed forms above. In symmetric equilibria, bids under both designs are i.i.d.. This can be tested using the distribution of bids observed, and in practice simpli…es our estimation as (b;
) and L n is the number of auctions with n bidders. For estimation, I use the tri-weight kernel K(u) = (2003) for an example.) The true revenue distribution always falls within the interval. The intervals for a lower r are narrower, holding n constant. On the other hand, more potential bidders correspond to tighter con…dence regions ceteris paribus. To understand the pattern, note the boundwidth of the all-screening probability is Pr(b 0n (X
r), which is increasing in r for a given n. For a given r,
r decreases in n and this o¤sets the impacts of a rising 2n n+2 r and a more left-skewed F X (1:n) as competition increases. The simulations suggest variations in the width of estimated con…dence intervals are mostly due to impacts of n and r on the boundwidths of F R I (r) . Figure B3 reports F R I (r) and estimates of conservative 90% con…dence intervals for Design 3. Again, the true revenue distribution falls within 90% point-wise conservative con…dence intervals for the parameters considered. The impacts of n and r on the estimated con…dence intervals in Design 3 are the same as those for Design 2 in Figure B2 . In addition, Figure  B3 also shows impacts of distributional parameters and on con…dence intervals. First, holding n, r and …xed, the con…dence intervals become narrower as increases. This is because for all t, E(XjX t) gets closer to t as the distribution of X is more skewed to the left. Consequently, x (r) decreases for a given r, while the distance between v h and v l also becomes smaller. As a result, the bound on the all-screening probability is shifted to the left and becomes tighter. Second, the impact of on con…dence intervals depends on , holding n and r …xed. A higher standard deviation increases the width of con…dence intervals for signal distributions su¢ ciently skewed to the left, but reduce the width of con…dence intervals for signal distributions su¢ ciently skewed to the right. The impacts are more obvious for distributions skewed to the right. This pattern is explained by similar reasons above. Again, simulations suggest variations in the width of estimated con…dence intervals are mostly due to impacts of n and r on the size of bounds on F R I (r) .
Performance ofF k R I (r) with a¢ liated signals
When signals are not independently and identically distributed, there are no simpli…ed forms for^ and^ l , and the full nonparametric estimates in Section 3 apply. In this subsection I extended Design 1 for n 3 so that V i = P n j=1 X j =n, and experiment with the correlation parameter c to study its impact on the performance of estimators. With n 3, it is impractical to derive the analytical form of the inverse hazard rate f Y jX;n (uju)=F Y jX;n (uju). To …nd out the true revenue distribution, I replace v h (x; x; c) and L(sjx; c) with their kernel estimates in a simulated sample of 5 10 5 auctions, and calculate the equilibrium bidding strategies using these estimates and numerical integrations. The true counterfactual revenue distribution F R I (r) is then recovered with knowledge of the distribution of the highest signal X (1:n) . For each (c; n), I simulate 200 samples, with each containing 1; 000 simulated …rst-price auctions. For each r and revenue level t, Figure B4 reports the point-wise 5-th percentile ofF l R I (r) (t) and the 95-th percentile forF h R I (r) (t) out of 200 pairs of estimates. This forms estimates for a conservative 90% con…dence interval for the bounds on F R I (r) . Figure B4 shows the true F R I (r) lies within the estimated con…dence interval for r = 0:2 or 0:5, c = 0:2 or 0:4 and n = 3 or 4. Holding r and c constant, the widths of the estimated con…dence intervals decrease slightly as n increases. For r = 0:2, higher correlation leads to slightly wider con…dence intervals, whereas for r = 0:5 higher signal correlation leads to obviously narrower con…dence intervals. Smaller correlations among signals implies the distribution of X (1:n) is more skewed to the left, and the distance between v l and v h are bigger. These explain why a higher c leads to wider con…dence intervals when r is high at 0:5. On the other hand, when r is low at 0:2, the left-skewness of F X (1:n) o¤sets the impact of a wider bound [x l (r; c); x h (r; c)] due to a higher c, and may lead to a narrower con…dence interval. Furthermore, the theory also states for unscreened bidders, the distance between the envelopes on the bidding strategy decreases as signals increase. This counteracts the left skewness of F X (1:n) due to lower correlations. This is consistent with patterns in Figure B4 where con…dence intervals on F R I (r) never broaden substantially as revenue level t increases.
Part C: Optimal Reserve Prices for Risk averse bidders
Bounds on counterfactual revenue distributions can be used to bound optimal reserve prices for risk-averse sellers once their utility functions u(:) is speci…ed. Integrating utilities with respect to estimated bounds on revenue distributions fF
gives estimated bounds on expected utilities for the seller (denoted fU k (R j (r))g k=l;h j=I;II ). As with risk-neutral sellers, such bounds can help bound optimal reserve prices that maximize the actual expected utilities. I consider three speci…cations of sellers' utilities: u DARA (t) = ln(t) (DARA) and u CRRA (t) = j=I;II ) for DARA, CRRA ( = 0:6) and CRRA ( = 0:9) utility functions respectively. Table C1 below summarizes the maximum for bounds on expected utilities in …rst-price auctions, as well as a range of optimal r maximizing expected utilities derive by similar arguments above. In SP auctions, estimates of bounds on expected utilities under di¤erent utility speci…cations are all maximized at $96:39, with the maxima being 4:601, 15:776 and 15:825 respectively. As a result, I get a point estimate of the optimal reserve price r at $96:39 for all three speci…cations. Note in both counterfactual …rst-price and second-price formats considered above, the bounds on optimal reserve prices are similar across di¤erent speci…-cations of utility functions. This is because u DARA , u =0:6 and u =0:9 are all approximately linear for the range of revenues considered in our application. Hence estimated bounds on fU (F R j (r) )g j=I;II , as functions of counterfactual reserves r, are also close to being linear transformations of each other, and it is not surprising the bounds on optimal reserve prices fall in similar ranges. To sum up, for risk-averse sellers, the ranking of auction formats in terms of expected utility depends on speci…cations of utilities. This can be seen by comparing panels (a), (b) and (c) in Figure C . For both DARA and CRRA with = 0:6, expected utility from SP auctions (with an optimal reserve price) is higher than that from an optimal FP auction. However, for CRRA utilities with = 0:9, FP auctions should be preferred over SP ones under optimal reserve prices maximizing expect utilities. The pattern is due to the fact that F R I (r) always crosses F R II (r) from below for any given r, and that u =0:6 increases faster than u =0:9 for the range of revenues.
Appendix

Proof of a claim in Section 5
Claim:
for all x > x (r).
Proof. Di¤erentiating the bidding strategy under r w.r.t. x for x x (r) gives
For all r 0 and x; y x (r),
The equality of the two terms follows from the facts that Y < x (r) if and only if b r (Y ) < r and that b r (x) is increasing for x x (r). Taking derivative of both sides w.r.t. y for
for all x; y > x (r). Substitute (3) and (2) into (1) proves the lemma. Q.E.D.
are stochastically ordered in r. In this incidence, the monotonicity is explained by the fact that our measure of v 0 is low at $95:71 and that estimates x h (r) are close to r for all r.
Proof of the Claim in Footnote #10
Claim : Suppose signals fX i g i=1;::N are i.i.d. in FP auctions with N potential bidders and a binding reserve price r. If both the number of bidders with X i > x (r) and N are observed, then Pr(X (1) < x (r)) is identi…ed even if auctions with X (1) < x (r) are not observed.
Proof. Let X (i:n) denote the i-th largest signal among n potential bidders. Then Pr(X (2:n) < x (r)jX
Therefore F r is identi…ed, and Pr(X (1) < x (r)) = F n r . Q.E.D.
Derivations for Monte Carlo Designs
A. Closed forms of v l (x; x; c) and b 0 (x; c) in Design 1
Let X i = X 0 + " i for i = 1; 2, where " i are statistically independent from (X 0 ; " i ). Let " i be uniform on [ c; c] and X 0 be uniform on [a; b]. For the closed form of v l and b 0 , we need to calculate the conditional expectation v l (t; t) = E(X 2 jX 2 t; X 1 = t) and the inverse hazard ratio
. For any t 1 ; t 2 such that t 2 2 [t 1 2c; t 1 + 2c],
where S(t 1 ) = [max(a; t 1 c); min(b; t 1 + c)] is the support of X 0 given X 1 = t 1 . The second equality follows from the independence of " 2 from (X 0 ; " 1 ). The conditional density of X 0 given X 1 = t 1 depends on values of a, b and c. In the case b a 2c, f X 2 jX 1 =t 1 (s)ds. Thus both screening level x (r; c) can be calculated and equilibrium bids b 0 (x (r; c); c) can be calculated using numerical approximations.
B. Closed form of v l (x; x) in Design 2
Distribution and density of truncated normal distributions (with the underlying normal distribution being N ( ; ) are respectively:
where and denote the density and distribution of the parental (untruncated) normal distribution with mean and standard deviation , and (x L ; x U ) denotes the pair of truncation points. Suppose X is distributed as truncated normal on (x L ; x U ), then for all a 2 (x L ; x U ),
Then the numerator is Z a 
